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The Decline of Soft Inheritance

Scott Gilbert

Soft inheritance sounds opposed to hard fact, a weak analogue kind of inheritance
as opposed to the digital inheritance of the chromosomes. But there was, in fact, a
“soft,” developmental version of inheritance during the early twentieth century, and
evolution was understood by many leading biologists in terms of the rules of development. In 1893, the evolutionary champion Thomas Huxley wrote, “Evolution is
not a speculation but a fact; and it takes place by epigenesis.” He didn’t say that it
takes place by natural selection: he said that it takes place by epigenesis, by development. He was looking at a level different from the struggle of variations within a
population. Rather, he was looking at the origin of variation.
Before World War I, the fields of genetics and development were united in the
science of heredity (Coleman 1971; Gilbert, Opitz, and Raff 1996). There were many
modes of inheritance, and one of the most popular and most researched was the
mode called the morphogenetic field. One of the major research programs was
Gestaltungsgesetze, the attempt to discover the laws by which ordered form was
established at each generation.
A morphogenetic field was assumed to have definite boundaries, and to be
made up from a collection of cells that were specified in a way that told them
that they were members of the field. The interactions of these cells led to the
formation of a particular organ, and at each generation, fields were established
for the creation of body parts. The model organism in which the inheritance of
morphogenetic fields was studied was the flatworm Planaria. The flatworm splits
by binary fission—either transverse or lengthwise—and each part regenerates the
other part. A head will regenerate a tail, and a tail will regenerate a head. In
Planaria, the inherited information was embodied in the gradient that enabled
the organism to form a head at one end and a tail at the other. Upon splitting,
each half inherited the ability to make a whole and properly organized animal.
This is reproduction, inheritance, and development all wrapped in one (see Child
1915, 1941). This notion of heredity was based on cells, not chromosomes, as the
focal units of inheritance. Cells were seen as organizing into morphogenetic fields,
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and the morphogenetic fields then formed organs (Gilbert, Opitz, and Raff 1996;
Gilbert 2003).
The genetics program of biology was originally in direct opposition to the concept
of morphogenetic fields, and the demise of the morphogenetic field approach in the
United States was linked to the rise of genetics and to the research and writings of
an eminent American embryologist-turned-geneticist, Thomas Hunt Morgan. At the
turn of the last century, there were two main researchers studying morphogenetic
fields in the United States: C.M. Childs at the University of Chicago and Thomas
Hunt Morgan, then at Bryn Mawr College. At the beginning of his career, Morgan
studied embryogenesis and regeneration, and he published several important articles and books on these subjects. However, in the early twentieth century Morgan
abandoned the study of regeneration and lost belief in the ability of embryogenesis
to serve as the scientific basis for the understanding of evolution. He started studying the genetics of Drosophila, where inheritance of variant traits (e.g., red versus
white eye color) was shown to obey Mendel’s laws and suggested the involvement
of nuclear chromosomes. At first, he attempted to place his new mutations into a
framework of development (see Falk and Schwartz 1993). Each of his mutant phenotypes was seen to represent a different developmental step on the way to the final
phenotype. A mutation represented a frustrated developmental pathway. However,
by 1913, Morgan realized that he, too, was frustrated in his attempts to make a
unified genetics of transmission and development. In 1926 he claimed that genetics
and the study of ontogeny have to be separated (Morgan 1926; Gilbert 1998). He
then called the Planaria program unscientific and blocked the attempts of Child and
his students to publish their findings. He considered such work old-fashioned and
not good science (Mitman and Fausto-Sterling 1992). Indeed, Mitman and FaustoSterling sternly conclude that Morgan was so adamant in his ridiculing the field
notion because, in the 1930s, the morphogenetic field was an alternative to the gene
as the unit of ontogeny.
In order to see how the field notion and soft, developmentally constructed inheritance were removed from the evolutionary synthesis in the United States, we need
to go to one of the founding narratives of genetics. “The Rise of Genetics” (Morgan
1932b) could have been subtitled “The Decline of Embryology,” because in this
article, as well as in The Scientific Basis of Evolution (Morgan 1932a), Morgan portrays embryology, and soft inheritance with it, as a failed research program. Genetics,
he claims, is its victorious successor. Indeed, The Scientific Basis of Evolution was
about what Morgan regarded as the only scientific basis for evolution—genetics.
Everything else was the unscientific basis of evolution. Paleontology, morphology,
and embryology were all considered to be “philosophical” old schools: “older speculative methods of treating evolution as a problem of history” (Morgan 1932a: 13 ).
Genetics, however, “has brought that subject evolution an exact scientific method
of procedure” (Morgan 1932b: 287).
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Morgan tells a story, which would be amplified later by Dobzhansky and Mayr,
about the rise of genetics and the fall of embryology and the developmental modes
of inheritance. This story follows what philosophers of religion call the supersessionist paradigm, the narrative myth by which the early Christians claimed to have
superseded the Jews, and the narrative by which Protestants later claimed to have
evolved or developed past the Catholics. Morgan starts by redefining embryology
as a science of gene expression (something that embryologists had not looked at),
and having redefined it in such a way that it can’t succeed, claims that genetics has
superseded it. Moreover, all the things that embryology wanted to explain and had
failed to do, genetics could do (Gilbert 1998).
When Morgan claimed in 1926 that heredity had to be split into genetics and
embryology, he redefined both areas in terms of genes. Genetics was the science of
gene transmission, and embryology was the science of gene expression. Then he
claimed that the embryologists could not bridge the gap between the genes and the
trait, which, in fact, was not what embryologists wanted to do. Embryologists were
dealing with morphogenetic fields and cells, not with genes. (Indeed, many embryologists were distinctly anti-genetic and felt that the cytoplasm, not the genes,
directed development.) Embryology, Morgan (1932a) said, ran a while after false
gods and landed in a maze of ontological subtleties. Where embryology went
into metaphysical subtleties, genetics went into concrete chemistry and math. It is
noteworthy, however, that in the 1930s the gene was not any more “material” than
the field. Neither “field” nor “gene” had been directly observed. Both were postulated on the basis of results of experimental data, and both sought to explain
inheritance.
Mendelian genetics was very successful in explaining the inheritance of many
traits, but there were hereditary phenomena that did not fit into its framework. It
is fitting to recall that this year (2009) is the centenary of Wolterek’s paper on phenotypic plasticity and the notion that what is inherited are potentials for development, and those potentials can be impacted by the environment. The example
studied by Wolterek was the water flea Daphnia (Woltereck 1909). It develops in
different ways in different environments: when the individual lives in a safe environment, it has a normal round head, but in an environment inhabited by predators it
grows a protective helmet. And this developmental response is passed on to the
next generation. It is not easy to explain this mode of inheritance within the classical
framework of chromosomal inheritance. But these kinds of findings can be conveniently ignored if they do not fit into one’s theoretical scheme. And they were often
ignored. As Benkemoun and Saupe (2006) commented when discussing past work
on the genetics of fungi, “exceptions” were routinely autoclaved. We do not treasure
our exceptions, as William Bateson urged us to do. We autoclave them.
The Cold War and the rise of Lysenkoism in the Soviet Union provided much of
the context in which genetics flourished and in which “soft inheritance” was mar-
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ginalized or discredited ( see Gilbert and Epel 2009). Due to the possible mutational
aspects of radiation, the Atomic Energy Commission was responsible for funding
many projects of population genetics in the United States, and in 1959 the American
Genetics Society hired a public relations team to spread the good news of genetics:
not to bad-mouth Lysenkoism, because the American geneticists feared that their
colleagues in Russia would be hurt that way, but to tell that Mendel plus Darwin
gives you evolution (Wolfe 2002; Gormley 2007.) Clearly, to stop a competing
research program, you need not kill the scientists; killing their research funding will
do.
And, of course, one can also write a historical narrative into which the competing
data do not fit. This, as we saw, was one of the strategies of Morgan, soon followed
by Dobzhansky and Mayr (Sapp 1987). Dobzhansky (1937) wrote a history of evolutionary biology, largely the history of experimental population genetics, saying
that evolution is studied by looking at changes in gene frequency, and concluded by
1951 that “evolution is a change in the genetic composition of a population. The
study of the mechanisms of evolution falls within the province of population genetics” (Dobzhansky 1951: 16). So we have a proper subset. Evolution is a proper subset
of the mathematics of population genetics.
While Morgan and Dobzhansky wrote developmental mechanisms out of the
history of evolution, Ernst Mayr wrote embryology and soft inheritance out of the
philosophy of evolution (Mayr 1966, 1982). Embryology was seen to be mired—
pardon the pun—in typological thinking rather than population thinking. It was,
Mayr claimed, essentialist. But, as Polly Winsor (2006) has shown, in order to keep
evolutionary biology focused on intrapopulation processes, Mayr invented a dichotomy that had actually been resolved well before the time of Darwin. Although Mayr
did not think that evolution was merely a matter of changes in gene frequencies, his
analysis led him to focus only on evolutionary/genetic changes within species. He
maintained that evolution could be studied without paying any attention to the
mechanisms by which genotypes generate phenotypes (Mayr 1982). And since evolution had no need for a theory of body construction, it had no need for the possibilities of soft inheritance.
We now can observe that inheritance can be affected by several means. DNA
methylation can inactivate a gene as well as mutation, and gene methylation differences (epialleles) can be inherited from one generation to the next. Moreover,
symbionts provide a parallel system of inheritance, and in many cases the symbionts
can alter gene expression in their hosts or provide various proteins to their cells
(see Jablonka and Raz 2009; Gilbert and Epel 2009; chapter 27 this volume). Here,
variation can be provided by “soft inheritance.” This analysis could not have been
accomplished without restriction enzyme analysis, polymerase chain reaction, and
high-throughput RNA analysis. It is therefore ironic that the most reductionist, the
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most analytical, molecular tools have actually ended up showing the necessity, and
indeed the reality, of the soft inheritance that had been excluded from the study of
evolution.
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